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Studies of veteran education benefits typically focus on the rates of GI Bill usage and 
dollar amounts collected, while also observing resultant employment and earnings data. There is 
a lack of research on Tuition Assistance (TA) trends of active duty military members. In 
addition, studies of usage patterns at for-profit institutions are lacking. Despite recent legislation 
protecting military members from the predatory practices of some for-profit institutions, TA is 
still used at many. This paper utilizes data collected regarding the 2016-2017 academic year 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System to note trends in TA usage, specifically at for-profit colleges and universities. I also 
compare TA usage at these institutions to GI Bill usage and note that ultimately there are still 
strong factors that drive military students to attend for-profit schools despite their reputations. 
The availability of distance-learning courses and cost of education are statistically significant 
factors in a student’s decision to attend a for-profit institution utilizing TA, showing evidence 
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The Veterans Administration has recently come under scrutiny for its poor performance 
in caring for veterans after they have left active duty service. Veterans make up about 14% of the 
homeless population in the United States,1 and wait times at veteran hospitals have been 
excessive to the point where veteran health has been jeopardized. There has been a renewed 
focus on care for veterans starting with the Obama administration and continuing under the 
Trump administration. One critical benefit designed to position veterans for careers and future 
opportunities while serving and after separation is the GI Bill program. In addition to the GI Bill, 
Department of Defense Tuition Assistance (TA) is available for servicemembers who have not 
yet separated from their respective branch of service. These programs provide money for 
undergraduate, graduate, and technical training for veterans, in most cases covering most or all 
tuition, and, in the case of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, providing a stipend for housing when the 
member is no longer serving on active duty. 
 Overall, the education benefits available to veterans have proven to be beneficial in 
making veterans competitive with their civilian peers, as well as making up for the financial 
burden and wage loss associated with attending college and delaying a civilian career.2,3 These 
benefits are not only designed to help veterans excel outside the military, but also as retention 
incentives; they typically require a minimum service period or incur an additional service 
commitment upon usage of the benefit. Since its passing in 2008, the Post-9/11 GI Bill has 
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proven to be a powerful incentive for servicemembers, bringing greater usage rates than its 
predecessor, the Montgomery GI Bill. Still, restrictions on where and how veterans use their 
benefits have been relatively lax in order to enable veterans to choose from a variety of 
specialties. At the same time, this ability to utilize benefits at a broad range of institutions has 
had some negative consequences. 
 Over the years, there have been countless attempts by various companies, organizations, 
and institutions to take advantage of veterans and their benefits for financial gain. Examples 
include loan stores which target military members to apply for loans with high interest rates, 
mortgage companies attempting to hook veterans in with unnecessary refinancing terms, and for-
profit colleges targeting veteran GI Bill users, to name a few. The latter group came under fire 
under the Obama administration, prompting new legislation limiting the availability of TA and 
GI Bill benefits to these institutions, though recent legislation rescinds some of these 
restrictions.4 Existing research calls into question the validity of a for-profit college degree, as 
well as the ways by which these institutions take advantage of various legal loopholes.5, 6, 7 
 The Department of Education has been reporting statistics on veteran status and GI Bill 
and TA usage since 2013. Recent trends indicate that usage of GI Bill benefits at for-profit 
institutions is declining, yet these schools still thrive and continue to target veterans and their 
money. Additionally, the trends have only noted Post-9/11 GI Bill usage at these institutions and 
have neglected to consider TA usage. This paper will observe Department of Education data 
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from the academic year 2017-2018, comparing GI Bill benefit usage at for-profit institutions to 
TA benefit usage to determine which factors most strongly influence a person’s desire to use his 
or her benefit at a given for-profit institution. 
2. Literature Review 
The Department of Defense (DoD) and Veteran’s Administration (VA) have sought to 
maintain high retention standards while simultaneously caring for servicemembers. As a tool to 
do both, each department offers various educational benefits to Active Duty, Reserve, National 
Guard, and retired veterans. The key education benefits available to these groups are Tuition 
Assistance, the Montgomery GI Bill, and the Post-9/11 GI Bill. In 1944, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt introduced an initiative to encourage veterans returning from World War II to attend 
the nation’s colleges and universities; this initiative became known as the Serviceman’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944. The program was immensely popular, with veterans accounting for 
49 percent of college admissions in 1947.8 In 1985, Congress passed legislation to enact the 
Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB), eligibility for which was relatively limited; an individual needed 
to elect to participate in the program by committing to a reduction in pay of $100 for 12 months. 
He or she had to complete a minimum active duty service commitment, typically three years. 
Additionally, he or she could not have been commissioned through a military academy or have 
received a certain amount of ROTC scholarship funds.9 
 The Post-9/11 GI Bill, formally known as the Veterans Educational Assistance Act, was 
passed by Congress in 2008. It retroactively provided additional benefits to active duty 
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servicemembers with service after September 11, 2001.10 A key component of this most recent 
bill is the ability of servicemembers to receive a Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) pay to 
cover living expenses. Additionally, eligible veterans receive full tuition and fees at any public 
college or university in their state of residence.11 Another provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill is 
the ability of eligible servicemembers to transfer benefits to spouses or children. In order to do 
this, the servicemember must have served six years of service in the armed forces and agree to 
serve an additional four years.12 This has become an attractive option for many servicemembers 
who plan to serve ten or more years, especially because they are unable to receive the BAH pay 
while on active duty. 
Utilization and Desired Effects 
 As with any government program designed to stimulate a specific outcome, there have 
been many studies that have sought to explain the effects (intended and unintended) of these 
initiatives. Due to the intricacies of the various GI Bills and regular updates that occur to 
education funding for veterans, these studies have continuously been released and built upon 
throughout the years. Generally, much of the scholarly research that has been done has centered 
around whether or not these programs have had the intended benefits for servicemembers, and on 
what the after-effects of their usage have been.13 
 In addition to retaining members, one of the main goals of veterans’ education assistance 
has been to encourage veterans to attend a college or university while serving on, or upon 
separation from, the armed forces. In terms of the validity of a subsidy encouraging a potential 
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student to attend a university, there is evidence that this is a sound argument. In general, 
financial aid has been shown to increase rates of college attendance, specifically among groups 
that have typically low college attendance.14 It has also been established that, while many 
scholarship recipients take longer to complete their degrees, they nonetheless have a higher 
college attendance and completion rate over the course of five years when compared to non-aid 
receiving counterparts.15 
Bound & Turner established evidence that the earliest GI Bill of 1944 did in fact correlate 
to higher educational attainment.16 They observed within-birth-year educational attainment 
between World War II veterans and non-veterans, and noted substantial gaps in collegiate 
education levels. On the other hand, the effects of the post-World War II GI Bill on minority 
veterans have been mixed depending on where the veteran lives, though they still generally show 
a positive correlation to GI Bill usage and educational attainment.17, 18 
When observing Vietnam-era veterans, similar trends have been noted. When controlling 
for the draft of the Vietnam War, veterans still had markedly greater schooling gains than non-
veterans which can be attributed to GI Bill usage rather than draft-avoidance.19 Since the passing 
of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, overall college enrollment has increased by 3 percentage points on 
average, and the effect was much larger immediately after the Bill’s adoption; additionally, 
enrollment has been consistent and positive especially among older veterans, as older veterans 
are relatively more responsive to financial incentives. Enrollment effects seem to be consistent 
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Returning Veterans?" Journal of Labor Economics 20, no. 4 (2002): 784-815. doi:10.1086/342012. 
17 Herbold, Hilary. "Never a Level Playing Field: Blacks and the GI Bill." The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, no. 6 (1994): 104. 
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among veterans of all education levels, since the Bill can be used towards undergraduate, 
graduate, and technical studies. The most recent GI Bill also has shifted the composition of 
enrollment toward four-year schools, and has encouraged veterans to attend more expensive 
schools.20, 21 
As a retention tool, the Post-9/11 GI Bill may not be the most fiscally ideal choice due to 
the transferability benefit. Theoretically, because the Bill requires six years of service with a 
commitment of additional four upon transferring the benefit to dependents, there would be 
incentive to remain in the armed forces in order to obtain this benefit. However, the costs to the 
government of providing the GI Bill to the many people who serve the bare minimum required 
time can outweigh the benefits in manpower obtained from people retained beyond the base ten 
combined years of service. When this initiative is applied across the board, the Post 9/11 GI Bill 
is not cost-advantageous to the Services. Instead, the transferability benefit is only cost-
advantageous when offered to a population of servicemembers who value transferability more 
than the actual cost of the Bill; these members are likely to stay in service beyond the minimum 
commitment.22 
Campus Life and Completion Rates 
 Overall, veteran education benefits are typically paid directly to the institutions, a process 
which has improved greatly over time. Transitions for military members to academic 
environments is a concern for the majority of servicemembers, but the level of academic and 
career-oriented resources is typically adequate. Nonetheless, there is room for improvement from 
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most colleges and universities when it comes to these programs. Resources for veterans with 
disabilities on campus are typically also only considered adequate, but most colleges and 
universities have improved these programs in recent years.23, 24 
 When it comes to actual degree completion under the various GI Bills, veteran grade 
point averages are on par with the national average. These GPAs correlate strongly to academic 
retention and degree completion, and veterans average 24 credits per academic year, which puts 
them well within the national average time to earn a bachelor’s degree.25  
Impact on Earnings 
 The ultimate goal of any educational aid is to enable a student to not only attend an 
institution, but to complete his or her degree successfully and in a timely manner, and to obtain 
adequate employment upon completion. When observing the impact of a college education on 
earnings, it is well established that the value of an undergraduate or graduate degree is worth the 
cost and time.26 Veterans, however, must compensate for an earnings loss that occurs when 
serving in the armed forces due to a lack of civilian work experience.27 In general, despite the 
increase in schooling brought about by the GI Bills, the benefit received from the GI Bill on 
earnings is essentially zero when factoring in the earnings loss.28 
Usage at For-Profit Schools 
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There has been a long-standing debate regarding the predatory practices of many for-
profit institutions on veterans. Often, for-profit colleges are among the lowest performing in the 
United States and maintain some of the lowest graduation rates in addition to some of the highest 
tuition rates.29 Additionally, graduates of for-profit schools are less likely to obtain employment 
after graduation, and are also paid significantly less than their counterparts who obtained similar 
degrees from non-profit colleges and universities. For-profit college graduates are also therefore 
likely to have higher debt-to-income burdens, further questioning the true value of these 
institutions.30 
A statute called the 90/10 rule, which dictates that for-profit institutions are required to 
obtain at least 10% of their income from other than Title IV federal student financial aid, exists 
to protect students from attending some of these high-risk institutions using federal aid. 
However, because of the fact that the GI Bills and Tuition Assistance are not considered Title IV 
federal aid, for-profit institutions are incentivized to enroll as many servicemembers as possible 
in order to obtain more revenue from other students utilizing Title IV aid; in fact, using this 
loophole, many of these institutions obtain nearly 100% of their funding from the federal 
government.31, 32, 33 
The methods by which for-profit institutions recruit students are typically through 
aggressive marketing, touting their degrees as an affordable, career-driven, and legitimate 
alternative to a traditional institution. A Government Accountability Office investigation in 2010 
uncovered fraudulent practices at several for-profit institutions, leading to a 2012 Executive 
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Order setting standards for any institution receiving funds through veteran assistance programs. 
However, further legislation has since been passed which loosens regulations on the for-profit 
education industry.34 
For-profit institutions tend to increase their tuition rates when the amount of GI Bill 
benefit and Department of Defense Tuition Assistance (TA) money available increases, a trend 
which has been noted in recent research.35 Recently, there has actually been a trend of GI Bill 
usage declining slightly at for-profit institutions. However, there is a significant understatement 
of revenue at these institutions because the Department of Veterans Affairs only reports tuition 
payments for the Post-9/11 benefit, excluding other benefits. Additionally, Department of 
Defense Tuition Assistance usage has not been observed in these recent studies.36 Because of the 
fact that TA seems to be a neglected data point when looking at veteran education practices, this 
capstone will focus on the recent trends in not only GI Bill usage, but also TA utilization at for-
profit institutions to get a better understanding of whether or not these schools are truly losing 
veteran students and their money. 
3. Data and Methods 
 In order to observe which variables effect TA usage at for-profit schools, data was 
extracted from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Each year, the NCES 
conducts a thorough postsecondary education survey and collects all the data in a database called 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). The data for this analysis came 
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from the IPEDS tables, narrowed down to for-profit schools in the year 2017; this was the most 
recent year with complete data at the time of this capstone.  
These surveys contain hundreds of potential variables on institution properties, financial 
aid, costs, and employee makeup, to name a few. In order to retain a large dataset while keeping 
the analysis manageable, only a few key variables were used. The dependent variable to be 
observed was amount of Tuition Assistance used, in dollars, for graduate and undergraduate 
students combined. The goal is to observe trends in TA amounts used at each for-profit 
institution based on a few key independent variables. The independent variables included 
graduation rate for the total cohort, tuition, sector ID (with a 1 being assigned to less than two-
year institutions, a 2 being assigned to two-year institutions, and a 3 being assigned to four year 
or above institutions), and percentage of courses offered completely by distance learning.  
These independent variables were deemed most important for several reasons. 
Graduation rate is commonly used as a key indicator of educational success, both in regard to 
student success and institutional success. Tuition was chosen to observe whether schools with 
higher tuition were commanding greater amounts of TA, or whether they tended to adjust their 
tuition to maximum TA amounts in order to increase enrollment. Sector ID was vital in 
determining where students are using their TA, since amount of schooling often corresponds to 
increases in earnings, one of the many key factors in determining educational success. Finally, 
percentage of courses offered via distance learning is an important factor in the ability to use TA, 
as military members are constantly required to deploy and move around the globe. 
Summary statistics can be seen in Appendix A, Tables 1 through 6 and Figures 1 through 
4. In general, the amount of TA used at these for-profit institutions varied widely. The vast 




removed. The resultant dataset had the lowest institution receiving $30 of TA, and the highest 
receiving $91,229,471. At schools with higher amounts of TA being used, graduation rates were 
low, and appeared to be significantly below the national average of about 60% (Figure 1). Many 
schools with high amounts of TA received offered the majority of their courses completely 
online, something that makes sense for military members who tend to move frequently (Figure 
2). Tuition was relatively low when TA usage was high (Figure 3), and most TA users attended 
four year or above institutions (Figure 4). To determine which variables are statistically 
significant in regard to amount of TA used, chi squared and goodness of fit tests were run on the 
data to observe independence, data was transformed using a logarithmic transformation, and then 
a multiple regression was utilized. 
4. Results 
Chi squared tests were conducted to determine whether the independent variables were in 
any way influencers on the dependent variable. The independent variables, xi, were tested against 
the dependent variable, Y (Tuition Assistance amount used in dollars): 
Ha: Y is not independent of xi 
H0: Y is independent of xi 
Evidence of variable dependence was limited, with all cases except for one showing 
independence at the 95% confidence interval (Table 7). In the case of the distance courses 
variable, it can be seen that it is not independent from TA amount with a chi squared value of 
14,156 and a p-value of 0.0005175. A follow up correlation test showed a t-value of 3.2499, with 
a p-value of 0.001336 (Table 8). In the case of distance courses, I would reject the null 




squared test. Excluding distance course offerings, in all other cases I failed to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that the variables are independent. 
 Of note, GI Bill amount was significant at the 90% confidence interval. This points to 
evidence that there could be some relationship between TA usage and GI Bill usage. Reasons for 
this could be numerous, but given many schools’ military-friendly marketing tactics, it is 
plausible that schools which target military members would have increased intake of TA and GI 
Bill monies. Additionally, the military allows a top up option, whereby TA would pay for the 
difference in tuition not covered by the GI Bill. It is also possible that these institutions offer on-
base recruiting and course offerings, and tuition tactics which target exact amounts of TA and GI 
Bill usage allowed per credit. Institutions would then enable intake of maximum TA and GI Bill 
allowances per student in a process that resembles tuition manipulation. Such in-depth studies of 
TA and GI Bill correlation to tuition are beyond the scope of this project, but can be observed in 
future literature.  
 When observing data distribution, the majority of the variables were not normally 
distributed. To make regression computations faster, all data was transformed using a 
logarithmic transformation; the regression results can be seen in Table 9, with hypotheses listed 
below: 
Ha: There is a statistically significant association between xi and Y 
H0: There is no statistically significant association between xi and Y 
The model residuals are fairly symmetrical around the mean, which hints that this model fits the 
data fairly well. As far as the variables are concerned, tuition and distance course offerings are 




Overall, it can be seen that an increase in the use of TA actually equates to a slight decrease in 
the overall tuition at an institution. This could, as mentioned above, hint at tuition manipulation 
at these institutions; they know what the TA limits are per credit, and lower their tuition 
accordingly to meet these amounts. It also shows that schools may not be raising their tuition 
rates just because they are receiving more TA, which could potentially have a negative impact on 
the number of TA users at an institution. 
 Also of note is the trend showing that TA amount increases with an increase in the 
percentage of distance courses offered. This is not entirely surprising, since military members 
currently on active duty might see distance courses as more attractive options given their 
frequent deployments. For senior military officers and lawmakers considering options to reduce 
the amounts of TA used at for-profit institutions, one potential option is to offer on-base courses 
from non-profit schools, and allotting time for members to attend these courses during the week 
while they are at home. This could mimic the convenience offered by distance courses, while 
creating a structured environment that allows military members to obtain a valuable education. 
From a statistical standpoint, there is no doubt that there is a significant link between amount of 
TA used at these for-profit institutions and the percentage of distance courses offered, and the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. 
 It is important to note that these results came from data which omitted all schools that 
receive zero dollars in TA. When running the same analysis with the schools receiving zero TA 
included, every variable was shown to be statistically significant at the 99% level; additionally, 
chi squared tests showed that none of the variables was independent from the dependent variable. 
Upon closer inspection of the data, it appeared that because the number of zero-TA schools was 




significant number of outliers, which imply that the model is not a good fit for the data to begin 
with, even after transforming the data. Therefore, the model including zero-TA schools and its 
results were omitted from this analysis. 
 Figure 5 shows resulting plots from the regression on the data from schools receiving 
greater than zero TA dollars. The Residuals vs Fitted plot and Scale-Location plot give a visual 
indication that the model is relatively accurate, with deviations ranging between -6 and +4. The 
Q-Q plot displays only a slight curve up at the end, indicating that the distribution is mostly 
normal; this is largely due to the log transformation that was performed, since the raw data did 
not follow a strict normal distribution. Finally, the outliers that do exist are relatively immaterial 
when it comes to the model, as can be seen in the final plot of Residuals vs Leverage. Here, there 
are few extreme values, with the line for Cook’s distance not appearing in the plot. 
  As a comparison, when using GI Bill amounts as the dependent variable with the same 
independent variables, graduation rate and distance course offerings were statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence interval, and tuition and sector ID at the 99% confidence interval. The 
major findings here are twofold. First, there are numerous factors that contribute to a person’s 
use of GI Bill money at an institution, but all of those observed clearly have some correlation. 
Second, those using TA appear to place more emphasis on distance course availability and 
tuition alone rather than graduation rate and sector ID when compared with GI Bill users. This is 
likely because TA users are on active duty, which means they may feel pressure to simply obtain 
a degree in the cheapest and most convenient way possible. GI Bill users have much more 
spending power available, and, due to the housing allowance available only when not serving on 
active duty, many choose to wait until they have completed their service to utilize the benefit, 




can utilize the GI Bill, offering another demographic which would potentially mirror that of a 
typical group of college-aged students. 
Finally, it is worth noting that sector ID is much more significant here than in the TA 
group. The estimate for sector ID was 5.84, meaning that an increase in GI Bill dollars spent 
correlates to an increase in sector ID—in other words, more money is spent at four-year 
institutions than less than four-year institutions, which is a finding that would make sense. The 
real significance comes when noting that for TA amounts, the estimate for sector ID is not 
significant at 0.51588, which means that more dollars spent does not necessarily equate to as 
significant of an increase in sector ID. TA users may be spending more money, relatively 
speaking, to attend less than four year institutions than GI Bill users, pointing to a potentially 
predatory practice. 
5. Conclusion 
Despite a slight downtick in GI Bill money going to for-profit institutions in recent years, 
there is still a significant amount of Department of Defense Tuition Assistance money funneling 
into these schools. One of the most important noted trends is the low graduation rates of TA 
users at these institutions. When considering the fact that distance course offerings were also 
high, it is possible that students taking distance classes find it harder to stay in a program until 
the end, with a lack of on-campus resources. To combat this, policymakers should consider 
offering in-person courses on military bases which offer structure and access to professors and 
counselors. Given the fact that TA and GI Bill amounts used at a given institution are not 
independent, policy changes that were made regarding GI Bill usage at for-profit schools should 




Consideration should be given to observing tuition manipulation by these institutions. 
Increasing the TA allowances per credit seems unnecessary, since many institutions will simply 
adjust what they charge to this amount. Further studies are necessary to observe trends at the 
schools which receive the highest amount of TA dollars yet still charge a relatively low amount 
of tuition per credit. These thin profit margins seem to work well with such a high quantity of 
TA users, and it is worth studying these schools to determine whether students are graduating on 
time and with a usable degree; if not, policymakers should consider capping the total amount of 
TA an institution is allowed to take in. A potential course of action would be to close the 90/10 
loophole by considering TA part of the 10% of Title IV aid rather than fall within the 90% of 
non-Title IV aid. 
Overall, the biggest factors that influenced an institution’s amount of TA intake were 
distance course offerings and tuition. A few suggestions have already been made for how to 
handle these biases, although future research should consider other variables not included in this 
work in order to prevent omitted variable bias. Ideally, an in-depth study of postgraduate success 
should be conducted before major policy changes occur in order to observe the true quality of the 
degrees being received. Variables to consider include post-graduate income, employment rates, 
and job placement upon separation, as well as job opportunities obtained while still on active 
duty. 
Given that distance education is so critical to military members utilizing TA, it is worth 
observing the quality of these degrees, and then comparing those obtained through non-profit 
institutions with those obtained through for-profit institutions. This paper explored the latter, but 
a side-by-side comparison of degree quality similar to the one described above, looking strictly 




whether TA is meeting the mark. Ultimately the Department of Defense should consider whether 
it values these education benefits more as a retention tool or a way to improve the education and 
well-being of its employees. If the numbers show TA users are more likely to stay in the military 
longer than non-TA users, then perhaps the DoD is getting exactly what it wants out of the 
program. Still, there ought to be a way to achieve both retention and educational quality, as the 
two are likely correlated; those who feel more satisfied in their education choices will ultimately 
be happier employees who might choose to stay in their respective branch of service longer. 
Regardless, if the benefits are being utilized, the Department ought to ensure that 
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Summary Statistics, Total Amount of GI Bill Money Used per Institution
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
0 230,992 717,408 3,725,599 2,324,369 95,180,479
Summary Statistics, Total Number of TA Users per Institution
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
1 2 5 425.5 21 44,811
Summary Statistics, Total Amount of TA Money Used per Institution
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
30 4,290 11,410 864,668 56,134 91,229,471
Summary Statistics, Graduation Rate per Institution
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
0 18 33 38.13 57 100
Summary Statistics, Percentage of Courses Offered Via Distance Learning
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max
0 0 17 35.22 73 100
Summary Statistics, Yearly Tuition
Min 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Max










































Pearson's Chi-Squared Test Results
Amount TA vs Amount GI Bill
X Squared Degrees Freedom P-value
40655 40257 0.08081
Amount TA vs Tuition
X Squared Degrees Freedom P-value
27094 27027 0.3861
Amount TA vs Graduation Rate
X Squared Degrees Freedom P-value
15770 15876 0.7228
Amount TA vs Sector ID
X Squared Degrees Freedom P-value
352.01 378 0.8273
Amount TA vs Distance Courses
X Squared Degrees Freedom P-value
14156 13608 0.000518
Correlation Test, Amount TA vs Distance Courses
T Value Degrees Freedom P-value Correlation Factor
3.2499 219 0.001336 0.2144952
Regression Results
Residuals
Min First Quartile Median Third Quartile Max
-4.7473 -1.2416 -0.1846 0.8569 6.3739
Estimate Std Error T Value P Value Significance
Intercept 19.16171 3.36231 5.699 3.92E-08 99% Level
Tuition -1.18998 0.34326 -3.467 0.00064 99% Level
Sector ID 0.51588 0.80523 0.641 0.52242 N/A
Graduation Rate 0.10982 0.12193 0.901 0.36875 N/A
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